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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970501-CA 
v. : 
CAPRICE T. MARTIN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from an order revoking defendant's probation and executing the 
sentence for robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 
(1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the 1996 probation extension 
proceedings—including defendant's written request for an extension and his waiver of a 
court appearance therefor—properly extended defendant's probation, thereby giving the 
district court jurisdiction over later proceedings in which it revoked defendant's probation 
and reinstated his original sentence. 
Whether the trial court had the authority to extend defendant's probation is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness and given no particular deference. 
State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah App. 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, 
including: 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence - Pleas held in abeyance - Probation - Supervision -
Presentence investigation - Standards - Confidentiality - Terms and 
conditions - Restitution - Termination, revocation, modification, or 
extension - Hearings - Electronic monitoring. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having 
been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke 
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term 
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation, 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the 
hearing, 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation 
or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
? 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to 
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to 
believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified, 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing 
and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him 
if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the 
affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting 
attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning 
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf 
and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, 
the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the 
entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 24, 1993, defendant was charged with aggravated robbery and aggravated 
burglary, both first degree felonies (R. 8-10).1 On March 25, 1994, defendant pled guilty 
to robbery, a second degree felony, and the remaining charge was dismissed (R. 41-43). 
The trial court sentenced him to serve one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, stayed 
the prison sentence, and placed him on two years' probation under various conditions, 
commencing May 9, 1994 (R. 57-58). 
Before the year was out, however, defendant violated his probation by committing 
an act of domestic violence, using marijuana, and not taking substance abuse classes (R. 
65-68).2 Adult Probation and Parole [AP&P] filed a Progress/Violation Report [Report] 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(b) (1995), and a supporting affidavit seeking 
an order to show cause and a hearing (R. 67-68). Defendant and his counsel attended the 
hearing on January 6, 1995, and defendant freely admitted three of the four violations 
identified in the report (R. 72). The court revoked defendant's probation, then reinstated 
it for an eighteen-month period ending July 6, 1996 (R. 72). Because of his marijuana 
'The district court clerk did not paginate the individual pages of the hearing 
transcripts for use in this appeal. Accordingly, citation herein to transcripts will be to the 
volume number stamped on the cover of each transcript volume, followed by a colon and 
the internal page number, i.e., R. 277: 7. 
2He also allegedly failed to obtain a G.E.D. (R. 65-66). However, at some point he 
apparently obtained one (R. 72; 277: 8-9). 
4 
use, defendant was placed on an "intensive supervision program and electronic 
monitoring*' for six months, then returned to normal probation in June 1995 (R. 75-77). 
In May 1996, defendant's probation officer, Glade Anderson, arranged to meet 
with defendant about his probation and the fact that it was about to expire with 
uncompleted conditions (R. 277: 65-67).3 At the meeting, defendant was shown a 
document entitled "Waiver of Personal Appearance Before the Court" [Request] (R. 277: 
7-8) (a copy is attached in add. A). The request is a typed, one-page, double-spaced 
document which requests an extension of probation, waives the need for a hearing before 
the court, and notes that by signing it, defendant gives up his right to represent himself or 
to have an attorney represent him at a hearing before the court (R. 82). Add. A. In the 
middle of the page are four blank lines upon which is printed ""Probation extended 12 
months from July 6, 1996 for payment of remaining fine balance and completion of 
substance abuse counseling." (id.). Add. A. Mr. Anderson read the waiver form to 
defendant, who showed no signs of having trouble understanding the document's 
contents, and the two discussed defendant's failure to complete the substance abuse 
classes and the need for an order-to-show-cause hearing on the point (R. 277: 7-9, 15-16). 
Mr. Anderson informed defendant that the waiver was an alternative to having the 
violations presented to the court at a hearing before a judge (R. 277: 8-9). The probation 
3Payment of a fine balance and completion of substance abuse counseling were 
conditions of defendant's probation that defendant was not in a position to complete 
before the July 6 expiration of his extension (R. 277: 9, 18). 
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officer believed that the extension would give defendant time to complete the conditions 
of his probation instead of taking a chance that the outstanding conditions would result in 
revocation of defendant's probation and reinstatement of his original sentence when the 
July expiration date arrived (R. 277: 15, 18). 
Mr. Anderson attached the request to his Progress/Violation Report and filed the 
documents in court on May 28, 1996 (R. 80-82). (A copy of the Report is attached in 
add. A.) The Report gave basic background information and, based on defendant's 
request, recommended extension of the probation on the same terms defendant requested 
in lieu of the usual order-to-show-cause hearing (R. 81). Add. A. 
The last page of the Report provided an area for the judge to rule on the request as 
follows: "approved and ordered'*; "denied*'; "date"; and "comments" (id.). Add. A. In 
this instance, Judge Noel signed a line next to the words "approved and ordered** and 
dated it the same day the document was filed (id.). Add. A. Defendant gave neither the 
court nor his probation officer any reason to believe that he had reservations about his 
waiver or did not fully understand it (R. 82; 277: 15-16). 
Over the course of the twelve-month extension period, several other 
Progress/Violation Reports and/or affidavits were filed on September 30, 1996; 
December 6, 1996; January 17, 1997; and June 27, 1997 (R. 83-85, 97-98, 111-12, 115-
17, 242-45). These documents claimed numerous post-extension probation violations, 
including: multiple assaults, domestic violence, terroristic threats, stalking, aggravated 
6 
escape, assault on a peace officer, burglary, failure to make timely restitution payments, 
and failure to complete substance abuse classes (id.). After five post-extension order-to-
show-cause hearings at which defendant admitted the majority of the violations (R. 91, 
108, 134, 240, 242-45), the lower court revoked defendant's probation on June 30, 1997, 
and imposed the original sentence of one-to-fifteen years in the state prison (R. 246-48).4 
Defendant waited until March 12, 1997, to challenge the May 1996 written request 
for extension and waiver as involuntary and unknowing (R. 148-69). He claimed that the 
invalid waiver prevented a valid extension of his probation, thereby causing his probation 
to expire on July 6, 1996, and leaving the court without jurisdiction to take any 
subsequent action against him for probation violations (id.). By this time, all of the 
probation violations alleged against defendant below had been committed, defendant had 
been through several show cause hearings, and a final determination of the effect of the 
violations on his probation had been continued numerous times (R. 83-85, 91, 93, 97-98. 
108, 111, 134, 240). After defendant filed his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 
the parties stipulated to disqualification of Judge Noel (R. 174-79), who recused himself 
by order filed March 25, 1997 (R. 208). The case was thereafter assigned to Judge Leslie 
A. Lewis, who denied defendant's motion to dismiss and ultimately revoked defendant's 
probation, prompting this appeal (R. 227-38, 242-48; 277: 60-66). 
defendant's admissions to aggravated escape and attempted assault on a peace 
officer stemmed from his pleas of guilty to these charges in separate criminal proceedings 
(R. 280: 4). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The original charges of burglary and robbery stem from defendant's active 
participation with another man in the in-home burglary and robbery of five people at a 
residence in South Salt Lake City, Utah, on May 20, 1993 (R. 9-10). The men entered the 
home armed with an AK47 rifle and a knife, and defendant held both weapons on various 
people at various times during the event (R. 9-10). He also threatened to kill at least one 
victim while holding the rifle (R. 9-10). The evening's take consisted of $250.00, three 
pagers, a purse, a package of hot dogs, some beer, and two check books (R. 10). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: Defendant is estopped from challenging the validity of the May 1996 
extension of his probation and the district court's jurisdiction thereafter. Defendant's 
submission of an extension request induced the State and the court to forego other valid 
avenues for dealing with defendant's admitted violation of his probation. Further, 
defendant thereafter acted in compliance with the grant of extension, making efforts to 
comply with the probation conditions upon which the extension was based. Finally, 
defendant repeatedly submitted himself to the district court's authority by attending 
numerous post-extension show cause hearings and answering numerous allegations of 
post-extension probation violations. Consequently, he cannot now challenge the district 
court's authority over him. 
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Point II: Should this Court reach defendant's claims, it will find them to be 
without merit. Defendant's claim of entitlement to the same due process protections in 
his extension proceedings as is afforded probationers in revocation proceedings is without 
support. While probation revocation proceedings involve minimal due process 
protections, probation extension proceedings are entitled to even less because they 
involve a significantly less "grievous" loss. Utah law provides the same due process 
protections in both situations, but, in keeping with the lesser degree of loss involved in 
extension proceedings, provides for voluntary extension proceedings whereby a 
probationer may waive his right to a hearing and the attendant procedures and voluntarily 
request an extension of his probation. This statute comports with federal directives, and 
its application to defendant does not violate his due process rights. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, his request was knowing, and the procedures 
followed were sufficient to effect an extension of his probation. Defendant's claim that 
his waiver was not knowing or voluntary is belied by the record evidence. The district 
court found, and the record supports, that defendant had prior, first-hand experience with 
probation violations and extension proceedings, he discussed the situation in a meeting 
with his probation officer, he knew and understood the content of both the request he 
executed and AP&P's violation report, and he was '"an intelligent, capable and reasoned*' 
individual. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that his request was knowing. 
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Finally, the documentation used to extend defendant's probation was sufficient to 
accomplish the extension. No formal motion is required by the extension statute, but 
even if it were, defendant's written request would meet the requirement. The district 
court's signature at the end of AP&P's report granting the extension is not invalidated 
merely because of the absence of a separate caption, and the absence of findings relating 
to the extension request does not undermine the court's approval of the request. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSION TO THE LOWER COURT'S AUTHORITY 
AFTER PRE-EXPIRATION APPROVAL OF HIS REQUEST, AND HIS 
ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL PROBATION VIOLATIONS DURING THE 
EXTENSION PERIOD ESTOPS HIM FROM CHALLENGING THE COURT'S 
ACTIONS ON APPEAL 
A. Introduction 
Defendant appeals from an order entered June 30, 1997, in which the lower court 
revoked probation and reinstated his original prison sentence following his admissions to 
multiple probation violations (R. 246-48). This order was the last in a series of orders 
stretching over the three years defendant spent on probation. (A chronology of the 
procedural facts in this case is attached as add. B.) 
Defendant does not deny that there was good cause for the July 1997 revocation of 
his probation. His appellate claims focus on an earlier period during his probation when 
the district court extended his probation from July 6, 1996, to July 6, 1997, based on 
defendant's written request for an extension and waiver of a show cause hearing to obtain 
10 
time to comply with the conditions of his probation.5 Add. B. Defendant claims, in 
general, that the probation was not properly extended, that it therefore expired on July 6, 
1996, and that the district court was without jurisdiction to revoke his probation and 
reinstate his prison sentence nearly a year later.6 
By challenging his request for a probation extension, defendant tries to mold the 
interpretation of Utah's probation extension statute to his benefit. After having used the 
statute to his benefit by initiating voluntary extension proceedings to avoid the possibility 
of revocation of his probation for this second series of violations (Utah Code Ann. § 77-
5Defendant has never denied that he was in violation of his probation when it was 
extended in May of 1996, and defendant received exactly what he sought from the district 
court: extension of his probation for only so long as defendant requested under the same 
conditions existing when the request was executed (R. 81-82). 
6The tolling statute alone justifies the district court's actions subsequent to July 6, 
1996. Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) (Supp. 1996), the running of defendant's 
probation period was tolled on May 28, 1998, when the Report was filed alleging two 
probation violations (a copy of the statute is attached in add. C). Because the district 
court granted the extension based on defendant's written waiver, invalidation of the 
waiver as defendant argues would render the court's order invalid and leave the report's 
allegations without disposition. Consequently, defendant's probation would necessarily 
remain tolled beyond the July 6 expiration date, giving the district court authority to 
undertake its subsequent actions involving defendant's probation. Cf People v. Laws, 
558 N.E.2d 638, 640-42 (111. App.) (probation was tolled between filing of petition 
alleging probation violations and disposition of the allegations; once probation period was 
tolled, the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke probation based on a violation occurring 
after the date the original probation was to end), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 844 (111. 
1990); Perry v. Indiana, 642 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. App. 1994) (probation was tolled between 
filing of petition alleging violations and disposition of the allegations; a probationer 
remains subject to the conditions of his probation during the time the probation period is 
statutorily tolled; hence, defendant was properly subjected to revocation of his probation 
for a violation occurring on the last day of the tolled period). 
11 
18-1(10) (Supp. 1996)), defendant wants this Court to interpret the law in such a way as 
to permit him to escape the subsequent likelihood of revocation and imprisonment which 
arose because of numerous post-waiver probation violations. However, defendant's 
interpretation fails because: 1) his actions below estop him from obtaining the benefit he 
seeks; 2) the elevated due process rights defendant claims for himself are inapplicable to 
voluntary probation extension proceedings; and 3) the procedures utilized below were 
sufficient to permit a timely, valid extension of defendant's probation.7 
B. Defendant Is Estopped From Challenging The Propriety Of The Extension By 
Having Requesting The Extension, Attempting To Comply With The Extension, 
And Subsequently Appearing Before The Court To Answer Charges Of Post-
Extension Probation Violations 
"[E]stoppel bars a party when by acts, or silence, one induces another party to act 
to his detriment in reliance on that silence or act." Lone Mountain Prod. Co. v. Natural 
Gas Pipeline Co., 984 F.2d 1551, 1557 (10th Cir. 1992). That it applies in post-trial 
probation proceedings is widely recognized. See State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 
483 (Iowa 1993) (probation extension proceedings); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 942 
S.W.2d 289, 292 (Ky. 1997) (probation extension proceedings); see also In re Griffin, 62 
Cal.Rptr. 6, 431 P.2d 625, 628-30 (Cal. 1967) (probation revocation proceedings); cf 
7The State has reorganized the arguments presented by defendant, but refers the 
reader to the appropriate part of defendant's brief for each point, where appropriate. The 
State's Point I, however, does not correspond to any argument presented in defendant's 
brief. 
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Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986) (noting that parole revocation 
proceedings are civil in nature). The Kentucky Supreme Court recently held: 
Even if the trial court lacked [personal] jurisdiction [because the statutory 
probationary period had run], [the defendant] is estopped from challenging the 
court's exercise of that jurisdiction. [He] voluntarily requested the . . . extension of 
his probationary period, and he then accepted the benefits of the court's granting of 
the request (i.e., he avoided incarceration). As the former Court of Appeals noted, 
~[w]here the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, statements made for the 
purpose of giving the court [personal] jurisdiction, after they have been acted on, 
cannot be withdrawn or contradicted by the party making them for the purpose of 
taking away such jurisdiction/' 
Griffin. 942 S.W.2d at 292 (citing Duncan v. O'Nan. 451 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Ky. 1970)). 
Defendant's brief overlooks the fact that by his own act of obtaining the extension 
before expiration of his probation period, he prevented the court and the State from acting 
in any other appropriate manner by which they could have properly dealt with 
defendant's violations. Relying on defendant's May 21, 1996, extension request, neither 
the State nor the district court pursued an order to show cause or a hearing-legitimate 
avenues otherwise open to them under section 77-18-1(12). Defendant also ignores the 
fact that he acted in compliance with the court's approval of his extension request by 
making payments, albeit irregular, toward the fines and restitution imposed under his 
probation conditions and by completing the substance abuse classes within five months of 
executing the extension request (R. 83, 85, 99). Finally, defendant repeatedly submitted 
himself to the district court's authority by appearing at multiple show cause hearings for 
post-extension probation violations and admitting or denying each allegation (R. 91, 108, 
13 
134, 240, 242-45). Given defendant's actions in failing to withdraw his timely request for 
an extension before it was granted, and by continuing to submit himself to the district 
court's authority, defendant is now estopped from challenging the proceedings below. 
POINT II 
ELEVATED DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS DO NOT APPLY TO 
VOLUNTARY PROBATION EXTENSION PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY 
DEFENDANT, AND DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF 
HIS PROBATION AND WAIVER OF A HEARING WAS EFFECTIVE UNDER 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 77-18-l(12)(A)(l) 
A. Only Minimal Due Process Protections Apply To Voluntary Probation Extension 
Proceedings. And Those Protections May Be Waived 
While defendant contends that his federal constitutional due process rights were 
violated by the extension proceedings in this case8 (Br. of Aplt. at 26-34), it should be 
noted that the extension in this case took place in keeping with the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(l) (Supp. 1996). Add. C. Thus, defendant's claim appears 
to be more of an assertion that the application of the statute violates his due process 
rights. 
8This is defendant's fourth claim of error on appeal. Br. of Aplt. at 26-34. 
However, because a determination of the appropriate level of due process rights 
applicable to probation extension proceedings is a prerequisite to deciding the validity of 
the proceedings used, the State addresses the due process argument at this point of its 
responsive brief. Because defendant does not include a separate argument under the state 
constitution, this Court need address only the federal constitutional claim he asserts. 
State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39 n.l (Utah 1996). 
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Defendant argues that the procedures for extending probation should be identical 
to those for revoking probation because he holds a "liberty interest'' equal to or greater 
than that of a probationer facing revocation of his probation. Br. of Aplt. at 27-29.9 
However, because defendant is not entitled to elevated due process rights in probation 
extension proceedings and the statute's application was appropriate, his argument is 
without merit. 
Proceedings which occur after a defendant is convicted are "not part of a criminal 
prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does 
not apply." Morrissev v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972). "Due 
process is flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the given situation 
demands/' State v. Byington. 936 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Utah App. 1997) (quotations 
omitted). Hence, the level of due process protection differs in a contested criminal trial 
and in subsequent proceedings to revoke, extend or modify probation. See id. at 1116 
(recognizing differing levels of due process rights applicable pre- and post-conviction); 
see also Skipworth v. United States. 508 F.2d 598 (3rd Cir. 1975) (the standard of due 
process requirements for parole revocations does not necessarily apply to parole 
extensions). 
QDefendant also argues that the procedural rights afforded by Utah's statute "create 
an expectation" which gives rise to constitutional due process rights. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-1(12). However, the plain language of the statute limits any "expectation" of due 
process rights because it plainly provides for use of a waiver as an alternative to 
exercising those rights, as was done in this case. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12): Add. C. 
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The requirement of due process ''depends on the extent to which an individual will 
be condemned to suffer grievous loss." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481, 92 S. Ct. at 2600; 
Skipworth, 508 F.2d at 601. In the case of probation revocation, a probationer is 
deprived "not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the 
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special.. . restrictions." Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973) (quoting Morrissev. 408 U.S. 
at 480, 92 S. Ct. at 2600). Further, probation revocation proceedings carry with them 
"minimum" due process protections because the procedural rights and potential 
detriments involved in such proceedings do not generally warrant the same protections as 
do the constitutional rights involved in contested criminal trials.10 Bvington, 936 P.2d at 
1116 (citations omitted); see also Morrissev. 408 U.S. at 489-90, 92 S. Ct. at 2604. 
Unlike a criminal defendant facing trial, who enjoys the full range of due process 
protections, a probationer has a "more limited due process right" because he or she has 
already been convicted of a crime. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 789, 93 S. Ct. at 1763. In 
contrast to the guilt and penalty phases of a trial, revocation proceedings involve only a 
10The minimum due process requirements in revocation proceedings include: a 
preliminary hearing; a hearing for the revocation; written notice of the claimed violations; 
disclosure to the defendant of evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person 
and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses; a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional 
parole board; and a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and 
reasons for the revocation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489-90, 92 S. Ct. at 2604 (addressing a 
parole situation). These rights are generally encompassed for involuntary revocation and 
extension proceedings in Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12). 
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determination of whether the probationer violated probation, and whether probation 
should be revoked. Morrissey. 408 U.S. at 479-80, 92 S. Ct. at 2599. 
It is widely acknowledged that probationers facing extension proceedings are 
entitled to even more limited due process requirements than those facing revocation 
proceedings. See Skipworth. 508 F.2d 598 (holding that fairness requires minimum due 
process protections, but no hearing for probation extension situations); United States v. 
CornwelL 625 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir.) ("The nature of the interest and the loss resulting 
from extension simply do not parallel the fundamental nature of the interest or the 
seriousness of the loss involved in [probation revocation situations]"), cert, denied, 449 
U.S. 1066, 101 S. Ct. 794 (1980); United States v. Carey. 565 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 
1977) (extension of probation does not implicate a liberty interest sufficient to 
constitutionally require a pre-extension hearing), cert, denied. 435 U.S. 953, 98 S. Ct. 
1582 (1978). As the court in Skipworth explained: 
[A]n extension of probation is clearly not as "grievous" a "loss" as revocation, and 
here it entailed no greater restrictions than those which existed previously. In fact, 
the primary "loss" suffered by an individual whose probation has been extended 
lies not in the continuing restrictions themselves, but in the possibility of future 
revocation. While such a loss is indeed serious it is merely potential at the time of 
extension, and the due process clause clearly provided the protection of a hearing 
in the event that revocation proceedings should subsequently occur. 
Skipworth. 508 F.2d at 601-02.11 
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 Whether defendant is entitled to any due process protections at all in these 
circumstances is far from clear. He was admittedly in violation of his probation, and he 
requested the extension to avoid a revocation hearing and the possibility of revocation of 
17 
Because of the different liberty interest at stake, the due process procedures 
applicable to probation revocation do not strictly apply to probation extension. State v. 
Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Utah App. 1995); accord State v. Zeiszler. 19 Ohio 
App.3d 138, 141, 483 N.E.2d 493, 497 (1984) ("The due process procedures required in 
probation revocation hearings need not be strictly complied with in cases involving 
extensions or modifications"); State v. Jones. 60 Ohio App.2d 178, 396 N.E.2d 244 
(1978) ("The due process procedures required in probation revocation hearings need not 
be employed in court actions which extend the time one must remain on probation"); see 
also Forgues v. United States. 636 F.2d 1125, 1127 (6th Cir. 1980) (no prior notice or 
hearing is constitutionally required to extend probation).. 
Further, the United States Supreme Court has imparted a degree of flexibility in 
due process determinations which allows lower courts and state legislatures to determine 
what rights to extend to probationers in probation proceedings, so long as minimum 
requirements are met. See Gagnon. 411 U.S. at 788, 93 S. Ct. at 1763 (refusing to extend 
probationers' due process rights to include a requirement of counsel at all probation 
revocation hearings, leaving the determination to be made by states on an ad hoc basis); 
see also Byington, 936 P.2d at 1115-16. 
his probation. The State found no cases involving a similarly-w orded probation statute, 
similar facts, and a due process discussion, and defendant cites none. 
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Utah has statutorily provided probationers with the same procedural requirements 
for revoking or involuntarily extending probation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12). Add. 
C. However, the plain language of the statute grants probationers the alternative of 
voluntarily extending probation by waiving the need for a show cause hearing and the 
requirements associated with it, thereby avoiding the possibility of having their probation 
revoked at the hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a); cf. Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518 (Utah 1997) (when interpreting a statute, the court looks to the 
plain language of the statute and reads each word literally, unless to do so renders the 
statute unreasonably confused or inoperable); State v. Winward, 907 P.2d 1188, 1190 
(Utah App. 1995) (appellate courts look first to the plain language of a statute to interpret 
its meaning). This statute is in keeping with the United States Supreme Court's directives 
(Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788, 93 S. Ct. at 1763), and recognizes the more "grievous loss" 
faced in revocation proceedings by failing to provide for the waiver alternative in that 
instance. Application of this statute, therefore, does not violate defendant's due process 
rights. While he may be granted under statutory law the same due process protections 
applicable to probation revocation proceedings, his exercise of his statutory right to 
voluntary extension proceedings—actively requesting an extension and waiving a hearing-
-legitimately surrenders those rights. So long as defendant's request was proper, his 
claim of error in failing to receive the same due process considerations imposed in 
probation revocation proceedings is without merit. 
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B. The Evidence Demonstrates That Defendant Executed A Proper And Knowing 
Waiver 
Throughout his brief, defendant argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily 
waive his right to a hearing and to the accompanying procedural rights outlined in section 
77-18-1(12) for involuntary probation extension. Br. of Aplt. at 11-15, 22-25, 33-34. His 
argument is comprised of two basic parts. First, he claims an entitlement to notice of the 
extension proceedings and a hearing before his waiver can be deemed proper. Id. at 22-
25. Defendant ignores the fact, however, that he met with his probation officer and 
executed a written request himself for an extension of his probation (R. 5-7, 29-30, 82). 
Hence, even assuming a notice requirement, it was amply met here. Further, due process 
does not generally entail a right to a separate hearing on the voluntariness of a waiver. 
See United States v. Chambliss, 766 F.2d 1520, 1521-22 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 
Cf Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e): State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313-14 (Utah 1987) 
(hearing required before guilty plea may be accepted). Indeed, defendant's application of 
notice and hearing requirements to this situation would require the lower court to hold a 
hearing in order to extend probation "upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer'. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i). Such an argument robs the language of subsection 
(12)(a)(i) of its plain meaning.12 
,:Defendant's reliance on State v. Rawlings as requiring notice and adequate time 
to address the issues before the July 6 expiration date (Br. of Aplt. at 22-23) is misplaced. 
Rawlings dealt with involuntary extension proceedings commenced by the State and was 
based on subsection (10)(c), which has since been deleted from the statute. Rawlings, 
20 
Second, defendant claims, without citing any supporting authority, that before his 
waiver can be deemed knowing and voluntary, he must first be expressly advised that by 
executing the waiver, he is forfeiting each of those statutory rights. Br. of Aplt. at 11-15. 
However, the extensive, thorough disclosure assumed by defendant is not appropriate in 
voluntary probation extension proceedings at which minimal, if any, due process 
protection applies. State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1994) ("Almost 
without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied 
only to those rights which the constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to 
preserve a fair trial/*) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237, 93 S. Ct. 
2041. 2052-53 (1973)). Indeed, the "knowing and intelligent" standard has only been 
required to waive those rights "that guarantee the defendant a fair trial and protect the 
reliability of the truth-determining process." Id (quoting United States v. Lawson, 736 
F.2d835, 839(2ndCir. 1984)). 
Here, we are faced with statutory due process rights which generally warrant less 
protection than their constitutional counterparts. Byington. 936 P.2d at 1116. It is 
unclear what lesser level of disclosure, if any, is required before a probationer who is 
admittedly out of compliance with his probation conditions can request an extension of 
time to come into compliance. However, even under Rawlings' standard that a waiver of 
893 P.2d at 1067; Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1996). 
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due process rights in involuntary extension proceedings must be knowing, defendant's 
waiver is proper. 
In his first point, defendant challenges his waiver by attacking two of the trial 
court's findings of fact, which include the lower court's determination that defendant's 
waiver was knowingly executed by defendant. Br. of Aplt. at 11-15. Specifically, 
defendant claims that paragraphs 9 and 10 of the trial court's written findings are without 
any record support and, hence, are clearly erroneous. Id. 
Paragraphs 9 and 10 provide: 
9. On May 21, 1996. Defendant knew that an Order to Show Cause 
proceeding would be initiated against him if he failed to sign the Waiver of 
Personal Appearance, knew that at an Order to Show Cause proceeding he would 
be entitled [to] all due process and access to counsel rights available to criminal 
defendants, knew that he would have the right to admit or deny any allegations of 
such an Order to Show Cause, knew that he would be entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing at which the State would have to show, upon the evidence, to a 
preponderance standard, that a probation violation had occurred, and he knew that 
his probation could be revoked and his original prison sentence entered if a 
violation was found. 
10. On May 21, 1996, Defendant signed the Waiver of Personal 
Appearance form freely and voluntarily, knowing that as a result his probation 
would be extended for an additional twelve months. 
(R. 229-30) (copies of the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Order, and verbal ruling on defendant's Motion to Dismiss, are attached in add. D).13 
13At no point below did defendant preserve the challenge to these findings which 
he presents on appeal. Neither does he assert that the challenge was preserved. Thus, the 
claim is not properly before this Court on appeal. See Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 
356, 361 (Utah 1990) (failure to timely object to or move to amend or make additional 
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Findings of fact from a trial court are viewed on appeal under a clearly erroneous 
standard, which requires that the findings be against the clear weight of the evidence 
before error is found. State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah App. 1992). 
Defendant argues that, based on the evidence adduced at the hearing below, he 
could not have executed the waiver knowingly because he was never expressly told of the 
rights he was waiving. Br. of Aplt. at 12-15. However, defendant's challenge wholly 
ignores the fact that the record contains additional information, noted and relied upon by 
the district court judge in rendering her ruling. 
Finding number eight, which is not challenged by defendant, establishes a large 
part of the basis for the lower court's finding of knowledge: 
8. Having previously been subject to an Order to Show Cause proceeding 
on January 6, 1995, Defendant was fully cognizant of the possibility of his having 
an Order to Show Cause filed against him for failing to abide by and complete his 
probationary conditions, and was fully aware of the rights, and risks, entailed in an 
order to show cause proceeding. 
(R. 229). Add. D. During the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, the 
trial court remarked that it took judicial notice of the information in the court's file on this 
case relating to the first order to show cause proceedings against defendant (R. 277: 62). 
Add. D. The court went on to note that, based on these prior proceedings, defendant 
findings waived an appellate challenge to the findings). However, because elsewhere in 
his brief, defendant permissibly challenges the validity of the waiver itself (Br. of Aplt. at 
22-25, 33-34), the State reviews the findings as part of its response to defendant's 
remaining challenges to the waiver. 
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understood the option of an order to show cause hearing and his right to it (R. 277: 63). 
Add. D. 
Judicial notice is a substitute for the taking of evidence, and the trial court has 
discretion to sua sponte take judicial notice of appropriate things. Utah R. Evid. 201(c); 
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Taking judicial notice of the records and prior proceedings 
in the same case is wholly appropriate. Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 
1989); see also In re S.J.. 576 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah 1978). 
The record in this case clearly establishes that defendant was, in fact, subjected to 
an earlier order to show cause proceeding based on multiple alleged violations of the 
probation originally imposed in this case (R. 65-68, 72). Add. B. As with the instant 
extension proceeding, the former proceeding arose in part from defendant's failure to 
complete the substance abuse classes required by his probation conditions (R. 65-68).14 
Defendant enjoyed the full panoply of statutory rights which accompanies an allegation of 
probation violation: a Progress/Violation Report and an affidavit were filed (R. 65-68); a 
bench warrant was issued (R. 59), and an order to show cause hearing was held at which 
defendant appeared with counsel, participated in his defense, admitted some of the 
violations, denied others, and had his probation revoked and reinstated (R. 72). 
14The former proceedings also involved defendant's use of marijuana three months 
after being placed on probation, and his abuse of his former girlfriend four months later 
(R. 67-68). 
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In addition to this previous experience, defendant had obtained his G.E.D. (R. 277: 
9) and had no trouble reading or understanding English (R. 277: 9, 31-32). The district 
court judge found that defendant's testimony and in-court demeanor demonstrated him to 
be "an intelligent, capable and reasoned high school graduate, fully cognizant, and 
demonstrably able to read, write and understand the English language." (R. 228-30). 
Add. D. The one-page, double-spaced waiver form was short, simple, and 
straightforward, and it unambiguously informed defendant of his right to an attorney or to 
self-representation at a hearing in lieu of signing the waiver (R. 82). Add. A. It also 
identified, in one, clear, obvious, printed sentence in the middle of the otherwise type-
written form, the goal of and the basis for the waiver: "Probation extended 12 months 
from July 6, 1996 for payment of remaining fine balance and completion of substance 
abuse counseling" (id.). Add. A. While defendant claims not to have read the waiver, 
his probation officer testified that he read it out loud to defendant and discussed with 
defendant the need for substance abuse classes (R. 277: 7-8, 15, 31). The two also 
discussed an order to show cause hearing, and the officer explained to defendant that the 
document waived his need to personally appear before the court (R. 8). 
This record evidence supports the lower court's findings in paragraph 9 that, on 
May 21, 1996, defendant knew that because of the two violations plainly noted on the 
waiver form: he was facing a show7 cause proceeding; he would have a right to counsel 
and to a full evidentiary hearing at which the violations would be admitted, denied or 
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proved; and he would be facing the possibility of revocation of his probation and 
imposition of his original sentence. More importantly, it reflects defendant's reasonable 
understanding of the proceedings as well as his awareness of the rights involved therein. 
See Byington, 936 P.2d 1117 (discussing the standard applicable to a waiver of a 
statutory right to counsel). Finally, it supports the lower court's determination in 
paragraph 10 that defendant executed the waiver freely and voluntarily, although such a 
finding is not necessary to a determination of the validity of the waiver. See id (statutory 
rights generally do not warrant the same protections as do constitutional rights). 
Accordingly, defendant's request and waiver was knowing, and the trial court correctly 
determined that the waiver was proper. 
C The Documentation Used Below Was Sufficient To Extend Defendant's Probation 
In point two of his brief, defendant contends that no valid motion or order to 
extend his probation was ever filed. Br. of Aplt. at 15-18. Specifically, he argues that 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 requires the filing of a motion before entry of a valid 
order extending probation, that a motion to extend probation may be filed only by 
someone authorized to practice law, and that the Progress/Violation Report filed by a 
probation officer as part of his reporting requirements under the law does not constitute a 
valid motion. Ld at 16-18. Consequently, he argues, his probation was never legally 
extended, but expired on July 6, 1996, as scheduled, leaving the lower court without 
jurisdiction to revoke his probation and to impose his original prison sentence nearly a 
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year later. Id. at 18. However, his claim is without merit as the documents filed in this 
case were sufficient to properly extend defendant's probation. 
Section 77-18-1 does not contemplate use of a formal written motion before 
probation may be extended. The statute merely notes that defendant may elect to waive a 
hearing and extend his probation in lieu of participating in a full hearing. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(a)(i). Add. C. Defendant submitted a proper request for extension 
and waiver of hearing, which clearly identified his desire to avoid a hearing and extend 
his probation without further delay. Defendant's probation officer supported defendant's 
position and, by filing the Report, met his statutory duty to inform the prosecutor and the 
court of the case status. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(b). Add. C. On this record, the 
general purpose behind use of a motion was satisfied—all were aware of the issue before 
the court and had an opportunity for input-and nothing more formal was required. 
Even if a motion requirement is imposed upon a waiver under section 77-18-
l(12)(a)(i), it was met in this case by defendant's written waiver. In it, defendant 
"requested]"* not only that his personal appearance before the court be waived, but that 
his "probation supervision be extended" (R. 82). Add. A. The document states "with 
particularity the grounds upon which it is made and . . . the relief sought" from the court. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(a). In support of the request, defendant's probation officer submitted 
a report providing additional factual information, and echoing the grounds and relief 
identified in defendant's request (R. 80-81). Add. A. Contrary to defendant's 
27 
assumption, nothing in the statute suggests that a motion must take the form of an Order 
to Show Cause before it will be recognized in probation proceedings. Br. of Aplt. at 17-
18. Consequently, defendant himself met the motion requirement. 
Defendant also faults the district court's approval of the extension request, arguing 
that the initials placed next to the words "approved and ordered'' at the end of the 
violation report, together with the date it was signed by the judge, do not constitute a 
valid order because: 1) it was not entered pursuant to a valid motion; 2) the report itself is 
merely a report, not an order; and 3) there are no findings of fact on the record resolving 
any factual issues.1:> Br. of Aplt. at 17-18. First, as established above, the court's 
approval was entered pursuant to defendant's request and waiver, which satisfied the 
motion requirement, if any. 
Second, the placement of the court's signature at the end of AP&P's report does 
not mean that the court's approval of the extension request and waiver does not constitute 
an enforceable order. It should be treated no differently than if it were a separate 
15The copy of the Report executed by Judge Noel below was sent to AP&P, while 
the copy retained in the court's file has a date and conformed signature done by the clerk 
at Judge Noel's direction (R. 277: 17, 22, 25-26). Defendant does not challenge the order 
retained by the lower court as being invalid because it contains only the district judge's 
initials in lieu of his signature, as he did below (R. 153). Accordingly, the issue is not 
before this Court on appeal. Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 470 n.4 (Utah 1992) 
(where an appellant fails to brief an issue to the appellate court, the issue is waived); State 
v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997) (absent an argument as specified by rule 
24(a)(9), the appellate court will not reach an issue). Moreover, the original document, 
which was signed by the district court judge, was used below in the evidentiary hearing, 
and is included in the record as State's Exhibit 1 (R. 277: 17). Add. A. 
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document such as is routinely drafted and submitted by parties for a court's signature. It 
may be brief, but it is clear and unambiguous in its meaning: defendant's extension 
request is approved, and probation is extended twelve months for the reasons set forth in 
defendant's request and echoed in the Report. The absence of a separate caption should 
not render the court's decision ineffectual. 
Finally, the absence of findings of fact relating to the request does not define the 
nature of the court's approval. Br. of App. at 17. Such findings are not mandatory, and 
their absence merely suggests that there were no factual issues involved in determining 
defendant's request. Indeed, defendant identifies no findings which should have been 
entered, but merely notes that none appear on the record. Id 
Accordingly, there is no defect in the documentation by which defendant's 
probation was extended, and defendant's claim to the contrary is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J / ^ d a y of f^urulf^ , 199PT 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attornev General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
^iacU 
f LEASE RETURN THiS COPY TO: 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
275 Ec st 200 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt L2.V.b City, Utah 941^1 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT 
TO: Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
REGARDING: MARTIN, CAPRICE 
ATTN: Judge Frank G. Noel CASE NO.: 93-1900803 
FROM: Field Operations/Region III OFFENSE: Robbery, Second Degree 
Felony 
DATE: May 16, 1996 OBSCIS: 00076845 
PROBATION DATE: May 9, 19 94 ADDRESS: 3408 South 300 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
DEFENSE ATTY: David L. Sanders EMPLOYMENT: Swanson, S.L.C., Utah 
COMMENTS: The defendant was placed on probation for 24 months by your 
Honor and was ordered to complete all standard conditions of probation in 
addition to the following special conditions: 
1. Serve one year in the Salt Lake County Jail with credit for time 
served; 
2. Pay a fine in the amount of $1,850.00; 
3. Pay restitution in an amount to be determined by Adult Probation 
and Parole; 
4. Enter, participate in and complete substance abuse program; 
5. Obtain G.E.D. or high school graduation; 
6. Complete ISP supervision; 
7. Not associate with gang members; 
8. Testify honestly in trial as described by the State of Utah. 
* STATU 
( IXHIilT 
O AS* ^ £> 
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT 
RE: MARTIN, CAPRICE 
PAGE TWO 
The defendant has reported to Adult Probation and Parole monthly and has 
completed all of the conditions of probation with the exception of 
completing his fine and verification of substance abuse counseling. The 
defendant's probation will terminate on July 6, 1996. 
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY THE AGENT: NOTIFY COURT AND SUPERVISOR. 
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended that the defendant's 
probation be extended for an additional 12 months from July 6, 1996. This 
will allow Adult Probation and Parole to retain jurisdiction of the 
defendant for the verification of substance abuse counseling and fine 
payments. The defendant has agreed to this and has signed a Waiver of 
Personal Appearance before your Honor. 
UL4MJ l\ /<L«A4*9 
PATRICIA DENNIS, SUPERVISOR 
Region III Probation 
gy//id^/Jtir^ / 
GLADE ANDERSON, PROBATION OFFICER 
APPROVED AND ORDERED: 
DENIED: 
DATE: *D 'i*rhrl. 
COMMENTS: 
g:\parole\susan\martin.pgv 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
O. Lane McCotter 
Executive Director 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
FIELD OPERATIONS 
REGION III 
275 East 200 South. Suite 100 
Ray Wahl I Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Director. Field Operations I (801)533-4984 
WAIVER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCE 
BEFORE THE COURT 
Caprice 
Date 'a* ant, fff^> i <*jr 
, Cou r t Case # 
BSCIS #_ do hereby voluntarily request that my personal 
npearance before the Court be waived and 
hat my probation supervision be extended; AND/OR that the conditions of my 
robation be amended as follows: 
Trot/chcA ^rfe.yjdzA .fZr-xwd/ts, rroi^ Jtil^ &, /??£> for jMjfjii&M' 
CC(.utS(Un 
f-
T 
realize that by signing this Waiver I will not be able to represent myself 
>r have an attorney represent me before the Court; however, I am willing to 
^cept the extension of my probation AND/OR the above-noted amendment to the 
:ouditions of my probation, as stipulated to by the Court and voluntarily 
/aive my right of personal appearance before the Court in this matter. 
wmsTJp^f&t 
/ l t n e s s 
/(IttAito-
nvfioMW* ftf-fit^ 
'WJSL 
' i t l e 
Probationer's Signature 
Name (Printed) 
S.S.N. 
&?<?-( i • y^z? 
ADDENDUM B 
CHRONOLOGY 
FIRST VIOLATION: 
Probation originally imposed (R. 57-58) 
Bench warrant issued (R. 59) 
Violation affidavit filed (R. 65-66) 
(dom abuse; no GED; classes unfinished; mj) 
& Progress/Violation Report filed (R. 67-68) 
OSC hearing (R. 72) 
(admits, probation revoked/reinstated to 7/6/96) 
SECOND VIOLATION: 
Meeting w/Glade & def; waiver signed (R. 82) 
Prog/viol rpt filed/ct signs order (R. 80-82) 
DEFENDANT ALLEGES 
PROBATION EXPIRED 
THIRD VIOLATION: 
Prog/viol rpt & affid filed (R. 83-85) 
(irreg restitution pmts; classes unfinished; 
assault; not kept reported address) 
Bench warrant issued (R. 86) 
OSC hearing (R. 91) 
(admitted, viol found, disposition cont'd) 
D's Motion to Continue OSC (R. 92-93) 
(wants agg burg/assault charges decided before 
probation issue) 
5/9/94 
12/19/94 
12/20/94 
4- 1/6/95 
5/21/96 
5/28/96 
7/6/96 
-I-- 9/30/96 
10/17/96 
10/25/96 
-- 10/31/96 
FOURTH VIOLATION: 
Amended afiid filed & bench war issued 
(2 assaults; irreg pmt; dom viol) (R. 97-98,103) 
OSC hearing 
(denies, disposition set for 1/31) (R. 108) 
FIFTH VIOLATION: 
Def threatens estranged wife; arrested for agg escape, 
assault on peace officer, stalking, terroristic 
threats(R. I l l ) 
Prog/viol rpt filed w/affid (S. Morgan) (R.111-2,115-7) 
(bench warrant issues—R. 113) 
OSC; rinding prob cause of viol; OSC hng set (R. 124) 
(w/amended affid of viol by Kim Jensen - R. 125-33) 
OSC hearing (R. 134) 
(denies, disposition cont'd to 2/28) 
D's mot to continue OSC (R. 143-5) 
CHALLENGE TO SECOND VIOLATION: 
D's motion to dismiss (R. 148-69) 
Stipulated Motion to Disqualify J. Noel (R. 174-79) 
& order recusing self (R. 208) 
Judge Lewis conducts evid hng on motion to dismiss (R. 222) 
Findings/Conclusions/Order (R. 227-38) 
4 - 12/6/96 
4~ 12/13/96 
4 - 1/14/97 
4-- 1/17/97 
- 4 - 1/30/97 
4-- 1/31/97 
- 4 - 2/26/97 
3/12/97 
3/25/97 
5/8/97 
5/20/97 
FINAL DISPOSITION OF VIOLATIONS 3-5: 
Disposition hng on prior OSC (R.240) ~|« 6/6/97 
(admits violations from 9/30/96 affid & OSC; I 
probation revoked) I 
Def pled guilty to escape & assault on peace officer -J— 6/13/97 
(R.280:4) I 
2d amended affid filed & final disposition hng held -I-- 6/27/97 
(admits, violation found, probat revoked, I 
sentence reinstated) (R. 242-45) I 
J/m, sentence, commitment (R. 246-48) ~|~ 6/30/97 
ADDENDUM C 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1996 Supplement 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B 
1995 EDITION 
Place in Pocket of Corresponding; Bound Volume. 
Edited by 
The Publisher's Editorial Staff 
MICHIE 
Law Publishers 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
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CHAPTER 18 
THE JUDGMENT 
Section 
77-18-1. 
77-18-3. 
77-18-8.3. 
77-18-8.6. 
77-18-10. 
Suspension of sentence — Pleas 
held in abeyance — Probation 
— Supervision — Preaen-
tence investigation — Stan-
dards — Confidentiality — 
lerms and conditions — Res-
titution — Termination, revo-
cation, modification, or exten-
sion — Hearings — Electronic 
monitoring. 
Disposition of fines. 
Special condition of sentence 
during incarceration — Pen-
alty. 
Special condition of probation — 
Penalty. 
Petition — Expungement of 
Section 
77-18 11. 
77-18-12. 
77-18-13. 
77 18-15. 
records of arrest, investiga-
tion, and detention — Eligi-
bility conditions — No filing 
fee. 
Petition — Expungement of 
conviction — Certificate of eli-
gibility — Notice - Written 
evaluation — Objections — 
Hearing. 
Grounds for denial of certificate 
of eligibility — Effect of prior 
convictions. 
Hearing — Standard of proof — 
Exception. 
Retention of expunged records 
— Fee — Agencies. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings — Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
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(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has 
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3Ma) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions df law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's 
family. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of 
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompa-
nied by a recommendation from the department regarding the pay-
ment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) 
by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the 
trial court's sentencing determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
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department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of 
electronic monitoring; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including 
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest 
in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate. 
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse fines, 
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any 
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection 77-18-1(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
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(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the proba-
tion period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed 
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, 
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection 
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own 
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his 
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the 
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting 
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised 
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation 
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines, 
restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
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(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting a t torney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations a re based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence, 
(e) (i) After the hear ing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding t ha t the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or t h a t the ent i re probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accor-
dance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and mali-
cious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as 
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Heal th for t rea tment a t the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the super in tendent of the 
Utah Sta te Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that : 
(a) the defendant is appropr ia te for and can benefit from t r ea tmen t a t 
the s ta te hospital; 
(b) t r ea tment space a t the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2Kg) are receiving pri-
ority for t r e a tmen t over the defendants described in this subsection. 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chap te r 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the S ta te Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure a t the 
t ime of sentencing pu r suan t to this section, the depar tment may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pu r suan t to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the depar tmen t for purposes of supervision, confinement, and t r ea tmen t of 
t he offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representat ive; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representat ive, provided 
tha t the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relat ing to 
s ta tements or mater ia ls provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including s t a t emen t s by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department , except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The depa r tmen t shall establish procedures and s tandards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the depar tment in accordance with Subsection (17). 
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(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation u n d e r this section, it 
may order the defendant to part icipate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall a ler t the depar tment and the 
appropr ia te law enforcement uni t of the defendant 's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device a t all 
t imes; and 
(ii) t ha t a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so tha t the 
defendant 's compliance with the court 's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to part icipate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Depar tment of Corrections; 
(ii) order the depar tment to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the depar tment or the program provider. 
(e) The depar tment shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The depar tmen t may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section ei ther directly or by contract with a private provider. 
History: C. 1953, 7 7 1 8 1 , enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, ft 2; 1981, ch. 59, ft 2; 1982, ch. 
9, ft 1; 1983, ch. 47, ft 1; 1983, ch. 68, ft 1; 
1983, ch. 85, ft 2; 1984, ch. 20, ft 1; 1985, ch. 
212, ft 17; 1985, ch. 229, ft 1; 1987, ch. 114, 
ft 1; 1989, ch. 226, ft I; 1990, ch. 134, ft 2; 
1991, ch. 66, ft 5; 1991, ch. 206, ft 6; 1992, ch. 
14, ft 3; 1993, ch. 82, ft 7; 1993, ch. 220, ft 3; 
1994, ch. 13, ft 24; 1994, ch. 198, ft 1; 1994, 
ch. 230, ft 1; 1995, ch. 20, ft 146; 1995, ch. 
117, ft 2; 1995, ch. 184, ft 1; 1995, ch. 301, ft 3; 
1995, ch. 337, ft 11; 1995, ch. 352, ft 6; 1996, 
ch. 79, ft 103. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment by ch 20. effective May 1, 1995, substi-
tuted "Subsections 76-3-201(4) and (5)" for 
"Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4)" in Subsection 
(HXi)and replaced "Chapter 1" with "Chapter 2" 
in Subsection (15). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective 
May 1, 1995, added references to "interest in 
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4)" in 
Subsections (5Xc), (8Ki). <9Xa), (lOXaXii), and 
(13), deleted a reference to Subsection 76-3-
201(3) in Subsection (8Xi), corrected a reference 
in Subsection (15), and made stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 184, effective 
May 1, 1995, deleted a requirement of a "rec-
ommendation from the Department of Correc-
tions regarding the payment of restitution by 
the defendant" in Subsection (5XbXii); rewrote 
Subsection (6), making significant stylistic 
changes, decreasing the time that the presen-
tence investigation must be available before 
trial, which had been ten days, and adding the 
possibility of a ten-day period to correct inaccu-
racies in the report; and added "and disburse-
ment" after "collection" in Subsection (9Xa). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective 
May 1, 1995, substituted "the recommended 
amount of complete restitution" for "pecuniary 
damages," inserted "as denned in Subsection 
76-3-201(4)" twice and inserted "court-ordered" 
in Subsection (5Xa) and rewrote Subsection (9). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective 
May 1, 1995, added "which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring" at the end of Subsec-
tion (8Xf), added Subsections (16) and (17). and 
corrected a statutory reference in Subsection 
(15). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 352, effective 
May 1, 1995, inserted "if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel" in the first sentence of 
Subsection (6), substituted "protected" for "pri-
vate" and "Chapter (2)" for "Chapter (1)" in the 
first sentence of Subsection (15), added Subsec-
tion (15Xe), and made related stylistic changes. 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, substituted "protected" for "confidential" 
in Subsection (5Xd). 
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6 
ADDENDUM D 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CLARK A. HARMS, 5713 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
\ (Re: Probation Status) 
-vs-
CAPRICE T. MARTIN, 
) Case Nos. 931900803 FS 
Defendant. 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for Evidentiary 
Hearing and determination of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, regarding an Amended 
Affidavit and Order to Show Cause filed against the Defendant in this matter, on May 8. 1997 at 
2:00 p.m. The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge, presided. Defendant was present and 
was represented by Gregory M. Constantino. The State was represented by Clark A. Harms, 
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. 
The Court heard the testimony of Agent Glade Anderson of Adult Probation & Parole; of 
Ms. Pat Jones, Clerk for Judge Frank G. Noel; and of the Defendant, Caprice T. Martin. The 
Court received into evidence both the original and a copy of the May 16, 1996 
Progress/Violation Report, authored by Agent Anderson and filed with the Court on May 26, 
HlECDJST?KGTCCUaT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 0 1997 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Re: Probation Status) 
Case No. 931900803 FS 
Page 2 
1996, to which was appended the original and a copy, respectively, of Defendant's May 21, 1996 
Waiver of Personal Appearance. The Court also received and took notice of the docket record of 
this case. Previous to the hearing, the Court reviewed the pleadings and cases which had been 
filed, and was in all respects familiar and conversant with the facts and issues of the case. Based 
upon the testimony, arguments of counsel and evidence presented, and for good cause shown, the 
Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 25, 1994, Defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Robbery, a 
Second Degree Felony, in this Court. 
2. On May 6, 1994, Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 1-15 years in the Utah 
State Prison; the execution of each of the imposed sentences was stayed by the Court, and 
Defendant was placed on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections for a 
period of eighteen months. 
3. On January 6, 1995, Defendant's probation on each of these cases was revoked and 
reinstated for an additional eighteen months from January 6, 1995, upon his admission that he 
had violated the terms and conditions of such probation. 
4. On May 28, 1996, Agent Anderson filed with the Court a Progress/Violation Report 
and Defendant's Waiver of Personal Appearance, each of which indicated that Defendant had not 
yet completed substance abuse counseling and fine payments, and each of which requested that 
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Defendant be granted an extension of twelve months additional probation from July 6, 1996 in 
which to complete his probation requirements. 
5. On May 28, 1996, Judge Frank G. Noel entered an Order extending Defendant's 
probation by signing his initials, and entering the effective date of the Order following the 
''Approved and Ordered" language appended to the Progress/Violation Report which requested 
said extension. 
6. In the hearing on May 8, 1997, this Court heard testimony from, and observed the in 
court demeanor, affectation and conduct of Defendant, and finds him to be an intelligent, capable 
and reasoned high school graduate, fully cognizant, and demonstrably able to read, write and 
understand the English language. 
7. On May 21, 1996, Defendant met with Agent Anderson regarding his probation 
status, at which meeting, Defendant was presented with the Waiver form. 
8. Having previously been subject to an Order to Show Cause proceeding on January 6, 
1995, Defendant was fully cognizant of the possibility of his having an Order to Show Cause 
filed against him for failing to abide by and complete his probationary conditions, and was fully 
aware of the rights, and risks, entailed in an Order to Show Cause proceeding. 
9. On May 21, 1996, Defendant knew that an Order to Show Cause proceeding would be 
initiated against him if he failed to sign the Waiver of Personal Appearance, knew that at an 
Order to Show Cause proceeding he would be entitled at all due process and access to counsel 
rights available to criminal defendants, knew that he would have the right to admit or deny any 
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allegations of such an Order to Show Cause, knew that he would be entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing at which the State would have to show, upon the evidence, to a preponderance standard, 
that a probation violation had occurred, and he knew that his probation could be revoked and his 
original prison sentence entered if a violation was found. 
10. On May 21, 1996, Defendant signed the Waiver of Personal Appearance form freely 
and voluntarily, knowing that as a result his probation would be extended for an additional 
twelve months. 
11. The Waiver of Personal Appearance form is clear and unambiguous, is 
uncomplicated, and clearly stated that Defendant's probation would be extended for an additional 
twelve months from July 6, 1996. 
12. Defendant's signature on the Waiver of Personal Appearance indicates he was 
looking directly at the Waiver when signed, and had every opportunity to read the Waiver if he 
chose to do so. 
13. Pursuant to the Progress/Violation Report and the Waiver of Personal Appearance, 
Defendant's probation was extended for twelve months, not revoked and reinstated. Because a 
waiver and extension occurred, the need for an Order to Show Cause revocation proceeding was 
obviated. 
14. After Judge Noel signed the original Progress/Violation report, a copy was conformed 
by Judge Noel's clerk, Ms. Pat Jones. The conformed copy was placed in the Court's file, and 
the original, signed by Judge Noel, was returned to Adult Probation and Parole. 
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15. As soon as Judge Noel signed the Progress/Violation Report as "Approved and 
Entered", a valid, enforceable Order extending Defendant's probation was in effect. 
16. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(12)(a)(i), the filing of the Progress/Violation 
Report and the signed Waiver of Personal Appearance commenced the waiver proceedings 
necessary to extend Defendant's probation. 
17. Waiver proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(12)(a)(i) were thus 
commenced on May 28, 1996, over a month before Defendant's previously ordered probationary 
period was due to expire. 
18. Furthermore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§77-18-l(l l)(b), the May 28, 1996 filing of 
the Progress/Violation Report tolled Defendant's probation from that date. 
19. A probationer who is waiving his personal appearance and right to an revocation 
proceeding in order to have probation extended is not entitled to the same due process rights in 
such a waiver as would be accorded to a criminal defendant at a probation violation and 
revocation proceeding, in that the possible outcomes of the proceedings are so completely 
disparate. 
20. Defendant's May 21, 1996 waiver, and Judge Noel's subsequent Order based upon 
that wraiver, extended Defendant's probation until July 6, 1997. 
FROM THE FORFEGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, THE COURT NOW MAKES AND 
ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. On May 21,1996, Defendant knew that an Order to Show Cause proceeding would be 
initiated against him if he failed to sign the Waiver of Personal Appearance, knew that at an 
Order to Show Cause proceeding he would be entitled at all due process and access to counsel 
rights available to criminal defendants, knew that he would have the right to admit or deny any 
allegations of such an Order to Show Cause, knew that he would be entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing at which the State would have to show, upon the evidence, to a preponderance standard, 
that a probation violation had occurred, and he knew that his probation could be revoked and his 
original prison sentence entered if a violation was found. 
2. On May 21, 1996, Defendant signed the Waiver of Personal Appearance form freely 
and voluntarily, knowing that as a result his probation would be extended for an additional 
twelve months. 
3. Defendant's signature on the Waiver of Personal Appearance indicates he was 
looking directly at the Waiver when signed, and had every opportunity to read the Waiver if he 
chose to do so. 
4. Pursuant to the Progress/Violation Report and the Waiver of Personal Appearance, 
Defendant's probation was extended for twelve months, not revoked and reinstated. Because a 
waiver and extension occurred, the need for an Order to Show Cause revocation proceeding was 
obviated. 
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5. As soon as Judge Noel signed the Progress/Violation Report as "Approved and 
Entered", a valid, enforceable Order extending Defendant's probation was in effect. 
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1 (12)(a)(i), the filing of the Progress/Violation 
Report and the signed Waiver of Personal Appearance commenced the waiver proceedings 
necessary to extend Defendant's probation. 
7. Waiver proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(12)(a)(i) were thus 
commenced on May 28, 1996, over a month before Defendant's previously ordered probationary 
period was due to expire. 
8. Furthermore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§77-18-l(l l)(b), the May 28, 1996 filing of 
the Progress/Violation Report tolled Defendant's probation from that date. 
9. A probationer who is waiving his personal appearance and right to an revocation 
proceeding in order to have probation extended is not entitled to the same due process rights in 
such a waiver as would be accorded to a criminal defendant at a probation violation and 
revocation proceeding, in that the possible outcomes of the proceedings are so completely 
disparate. 
10. Defendant's May 21, 1996 waiver, and Judge Noel's subsequent Order based upon 
that waiver, extended Defendant's probation until July 6, 1997. 
11. This Court continues to have jurisdiction over Defendant, and Defendant was, and has 
been on probation to this Court at all times since May 28, 1996, up to and including the present 
time. 
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12. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the probation supervision, and the pending Orders to 
Show Cause should be denied 
DATED this C^i day of May, 1997. 
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Certificate Of Delivery 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law (Re: Probation Status) was delivered to Gregory M. Constantino, 
Attorney for Defendant, at 68 South Main Street, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on the 
[ZjL day of May, 1997. 
I/ /' / 7 J^i/v^" ^/ 
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 Third judicial District 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
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Deputy District Attorney 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CAPRICE T. MARTIN, 
ORDER 
(Re: Probation Status) 
Case Nos. 931900803 FS 
Defendant. JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for Evidentiary 
Hearing and determination of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, regarding an Amended 
Affidavit and Order to Show Cause filed against the Defendant in this matter, on May 8, 1997 at 
2:00 p.m. The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge, presided. Defendant was present and 
was represented by Gregory M. Constantino. The State was represented by Clark A. Harms, 
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. 
The Court heard the testimony of Agent Glade Anderson of Adult Probation & Parole; of 
Ms. Pat Jones, Clerk for Judge Frank G. Noel; and of the Defendant, Caprice T. Martin. The 
Court received into evidence both the original and a copy of the May 16, 1996 
Progress/Violation Report, authored by Agent Anderson and filed with the Court on May 26, 
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1996, to which was appended the original and a copy, respectively, of Defendant's May 21, 1996 
Waiver of Personal Appearance. The Court also'received and took notice of the docket record of 
this case. Previous to the hearing, the Court reviewed the pleadings and cases which had been 
filed, and was in all respects familiar and conversant with the facts and issues of the case. Based 
upon the testimony, arguments of counsel and evidence presented, and for good cause shown, 
having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and based upon those 
Findings and Conclusions, the Court now makes and enters the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. This Court continues to have jurisdiction over Defendant, and Defendant was, and 
has been on probation to this Court at all times since May 28, 1996, up to and including the 
present time. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the probation supervision, and the pending Orders to 
Show Cause is denied 
DATED this <A , J day of May, 1997. 
"HONORABLE LESLUTA. LEWIS 
DISTRICT JUDbE. 
ORDER (Re: Probation Status) 
Case No. 931900803 FS 
Page 3 
Certificate Of Delivery 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order (Re: Probation 
Status) was delivered to Gregory M. Constantino, Attorney for Defendant, at 68 South Main 
Street, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on the ( ^ day of May, 1997. 
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Utah Court of Appeals 
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Clerk of the Court 
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prejudicial to the defendant to correct that clerical 
error, if one exists, if this court finds one exists. 
Nothing further. Unless you have questions. 
THE COURT: No, I don't. It'll be the order 
of the court that the motion is denied. This court 
finds that the following facts exist. I find this based 
upon the clear, uncontroverted testimony. 
First, that a meeting occurred between the 
probation agent, Mr. Glade Anderson, and the defendant, 
on or about May 21st of 1996. That at that meeting, the 
defendant was presented with a waiver that he ultimately 
signed, that he was not shown or given a copy of a PVA, 
or progress/violation report, but rather, that the 
probation agent, Mr. Anderson, told the defendant that 
he wanted to have the defendant extended so that he 
could attend substance abuse classes, as ordered by the 
judge, and that, further, if the defendant did not do 
so, this matter would be taken to the court and the 
judge might well require him to be extended and attend 
the classes m -any.event. But •taased upon that 
representation^ the defendant signed a waiver. 
This*, court finds that the defendant is an 
intelligent person, ^ person who has demonstrated in 
this court, in this court's-, presence, that intelligence^ 
and specifically that he has*demonstrated the ability to 
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1 read and understand these concepts. 
2 That, in addition to having demonstrated 
3 intelligence and the ability to read, he also has a high 
4 school degree. In addition this, defendant is no 
5 stranger to the order to show cause process, and that, 
6 not only did he have the representation that he has 
7 J acknowledged from Mr. Anderson, but he also had a 
8 history with this court, and by that I mean with the 
9 Third District Court, in the same case that we're here 
10 on, before this judge, where there was a prior order to 
11 show cause back in May of 1994, and also in January of 
12 1995. | 
13 In both of those instances, orders to show 
14 cause were filed, and the defendant was served with 
15 copies of the same, appeared before Judge Noel in 
16 connection with the same, had an opportunity, as was 
17 pointed out to him, for a hearing in connection with the 
18 allegations in those different orders to show cause, and 
19 in each instance, the defendant, in court, admitted all 
20 or part of the allegations set forth in the affidavits. 
21 This court finds that, therefore, the 
22 defendant had a knowledge of what would have occurred 
23 had he not signed the waiver, that specifically he would 
24 have been brought before the judge, would have had an 
25 opportunity to admit or, in the Alternative, to deny, 
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and that he further knew that if he denied he was 
entitled to a hearing. 
So the court, this court takes into account, 
takes judicial knowledge of the fact that there are two 
prior orders to show cause in this same case, and that 
on those matters, based upon the court records, the 
defendant did, in fact, appear in front of Judge Noel. 
Further, this court finds that this is not a 
situation where a revocation ever occurred in this last 
instance, that is to say on the occasion of the May of 
'96 allegations, but rather, an extension occurred 
obviating the need for either an order to show cause 
hearing, or a formal revocation proceeding. 
That the defendant, having been presented 
with the waiver document, which, in the body of the 
same, in clear, bold-faced print, handwriting, 
indicates, "Probation extended twelve months from July 
6, '96 for payment of remaining fine balance and 
completion of substance abuse counseling." 
That document, which is titled "Waiver of 
Personal Appearance Before the Court," is not a long 
document, it is not a complicated document, it is not a 
document full of legalese. It is a double spaced, 
simple, straightforward document, and this court so 
finds. 
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And this court finds that the defendant has 
signed it in a manner indicating by the signature that 
when he signed it, it was in front of him, the signature 
is not from an angle, it's not upside down, but rather, 
and the defendant so acknowledged, was signed by being 
placed in front of him, which clearly gave him the 
opportunity to read the same, and this court finds that 
it would be almost impossible to sign this and not see 
the handwritten indication that probation was extended 
for twelve months, the time frame at issue, and the 
reasons for the extension. 
This court finds that, based, again, upon the 
defendant's prior appearances, he understood what the 
alternative would have besn, and that he had the right 
to that alternative process. 
The court further finds that an order does 
exist in this case, based upon the defendant's waiver, 
that that order is a document titled "Progress/Violation 
Report," filed in the court's file on or about May 28th 
of f96, the last portion of that document constituting 
the order. 
Specifically the document says, after a 
lengthy recitation of the history of this case, and a 
recommendation section that says* "It is recommended 
that the defendant's probation be extended for an 
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additional twelve months from July 6th of '96 to allow 
AP and P to retain jurisdiction of the defendant for the 
verification of substance abuse counseling and fine 
payments," the defendant has agreed to this, and has 
signed a waiver. 
After that—and the signature of the 
probation officer affirming the same—there is a line 
that says, "Approved and ordered." 
And the court finds, based upon the testimony 
of Ms. Pat Jones, that the judge did, in fact, sign that 
on that line where he indicated "approved and ordered," 
that Ms. Jones then conformed the copy that is in the 
file, sending the original that has now been marked as 
an exhibit back to AP and P. This, having been marked 
as an exhibit, is now before the court, and also will be 
made part of the file. Not to correct anything that 
needs to be corrected, but as part of the file. 
The court also indicates that if I were to 
accept the defense's representation that legally one 
cannot waive one's rights unless the proceedings have 
been commenced, I would indicate that proceedings had 
been commenced in this case with the filing of a 
criminal information, et cetera, that there is no need 
that a specific order to show cause be filed before one 
can waive an appearance at such a hearing. 
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In fact, the statute, 77-18-1 is very clear, 
and I'm referring to subsection 11-B, or excuse me, 
12-A-I, first, which says, "Probation may not be 
modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer." This court finds that that is 
precisely what occurred in this case. 
The court further finds that counsel for the 
state is correct in indicating that 77-18-1-11-B 
indicates that the running of the probation period is 
tolled upon the filing of a progress/violation report, 
and no one has disputed that a PVA was filed in this 
case alleging a violation. 
The court further finds that the relevant 
case law talking about due process talks about a due 
process right that, of course, exists when one is 
revoked. Again, this is not a revocation. This is an 
extension, and the two situations are very different, 
because in a revocation a defendant is giving up very 
important rights, and is before the court in the context 
where that individual can have his probation terminated 
and can have the original commitment imposed. I 
When someone agrees to an extension, waiving 
a hearing, a prison commitment or a commitment on the 
original sentence of the court', is not a possibility. 
Therefore, the defendant is not facing the same penalty, 
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as it were, and the same due process rights do not 
attach. 
If I were to find otherwise, in essence, I'd 
be saying that a defendant can never waive a hearing, 
and I do not believe that is the law. I believe, as 
long as the waiver is voluntary and intelligent, an 
individual can execute such a waiver on a situation 
where probation is being extended. 
And I believe that the waiver in this case 
was voluntary and intelligently made. And again, I base 
this upon the statements of the probation agent, and 
also upon the defendant's own statements, and further, 
based upon my observation of the defendant's appearance 
and demeanor, and the fact that he seems to be an 
extremely intelligent, confident individual who 
obviously can read, and has had the benefit of 
education. 
And further, I base it upon the other 
documents that are parr of the court record and filed, 
disclosing that the defendant had the benefit of other 
order to show cause proceedings, including appearances 
before the court where his rights were explained to him. 
Based upon that, I deny the motion. Is there 
anything further we need to set up in this case, or 
anything- - I guess we've got a'further order to show 
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